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Abstract 
Evidence on the “funding gap“ for investment innovation is surveyed. The focus is on financial 
market reasons for underinvestment that exist even when externality-induced underinvestment is 
absent. We conclude that while small and new innovative firms experience high costs of capital that 
are only partly mitigated by the presence of venture capital, the evidence for high costs of R&D 
capital for large firms is mixed. Neverthless, large established firms do appear to prefer internal 
funds for financing such investments and they manage their cash flow to ensure this. Evidence 
shows that there are limits to venture capital as a solution to the funding gap, especially in countries 
where public equity markets for VC exit are not highly developed. We conclude by suggesting areas 
for further research.  
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The Financing of R&D and Innovation 
Bronwyn H. Hall and Josh Lerner 
 
1.  Introduction 
It is a widely held view that research and development (R&D) and innovative activities are 
difficult to finance in a freely competitive market place. Support for this view in the form of 
economic-theoretic modeling is not difficult to find and probably begins with the classic articles of 
Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), although the idea itself was alluded to by Schumpeter (1942).1 The 
main argument goes as follows: the primary output of resources devoted to invention is the 
knowledge of how to make new goods and services, and this knowledge is nonrival: use by one firm 
does not preclude its use by another. To the extent that knowledge cannot be kept secret, the 
returns to the investment in knowledge cannot be appropriated by the firm undertaking the 
investment, and therefore such firms will be reluctant to invest, leading to the underprovision of 
R&D investment in the economy.  
Since the time when this argument was fully articulated by Arrow, it has of course been 
developed, tested, modified, and extended in many ways. For example, Levin et al (1987) and 
Mansfield et al (1981), using survey evidence, found that imitating a new invention in a 
manufacturing firm was not free, but could cost as much as fifty to seventy-five per cent of the cost 
of the original invention. This fact will mitigate but not eliminate the underinvestment problem. 
Empirical support for the basic point made by Arrow concerning the positive externalities created 
by research is widespread, mostly in the form of studies that document a social return to R&D that 
                                                 
1 See, for example, footnote 1, Chapter VIII of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.  
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is higher than the private level (Griliches, 1992; Hall, 1996). Recently, a large number of authors led 
by Romer (1986) have produced models of endogenous macro-economic growth that are built on 
the increasing returns principle implied by Arrow’s argument that one person’s use of knowledge 
does not diminish its utility to another (Aghion and Howitt, 1997). 
This line of reasoning is already widely used by policymakers to justify such interventions as 
the intellectual property system, government support of R&D, R&D tax incentives, and the 
encouragement of research partnerships of various kinds. In general, these incentive programs can 
be warranted even when the firm or individual undertaking the research is the same as the entity that 
finances it. However, Arrow’s influential paper also contains another reason for underinvestment in 
R&D, again one which was foreshadowed by Schumpeter and which has been addressed by 
subsequent researchers in economics and finance: the argument that an additional gap exists 
between the private rate of return and the cost of capital when the innovation investor and financier 
are different entities.  
This chapter concerns itself with this second aspect of the market failure for R&D and other 
investments in innovation: even if problems associated with incomplete appropriability of the 
returns to R&D are solved using intellectual property protection, subsidies, or tax incentives, it may 
still be difficult or costly to finance such investments using capital from sources external to the firm 
or entrepreneur. That is, there is often a wedge, sometimes large, between the rate of return required 
by an entrepreneur investing his own funds and that required by external investors. By this 
argument, unless an inventor is already wealthy, or firms already profitable, some innovations will 
fail to be provided purely because the cost of external capital is too high, even when they would pass 
the private returns hurdle if funds were available at a “normal“ interest rate.  
In the following, we begin by describing some of the unique features of R&D investment. 
Then we discuss the various theoretical arguments why external finance for R&D might be more 
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expensive that internal finance, going on to review the empirical evidence on the validity of this 
hypothesis and the solutions that have been developed and adopted by the market and some 
governments, in particular the venture capital solution. Although we focus our attention on R&D in 
the first three sections of the paper, much of what we discuss will apply to innovation investment 
more broadly defined. However, for reasons of data availibility and measurement the empirical 
literature has largely focused on R&D spending, at least up until now. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of policy options.  
2.  Research and development as investment 
From the perspective of investment theory, R&D has a number of characteristics that make 
it different from ordinary investment. First and most importantly, in practice fifty per cent or more 
of R&D spending is the wages and salaries of highly educated scientists and engineers. Their efforts 
create an intangible asset, the firm’s knowledge base, from which profits in future years will be 
generated. To the extent that this knowledge is “tacit“ rather than codified, it is embedded in the 
human capital of the firm’s employees, and is therefore lost if they leave or are fired.  
This fact has an important implication for the conduct of R&D investment. Because part of 
the resource base of the firm itself disappears when such workers leave or are fired and because 
projects often take a long time between conception and commercialization, firms tend to smooth 
their R&D spending over time, in order to avoid having to lay off knowledge workers. This implies 
that R&D spending at the firm level usually behaves as though it has high adjustment costs (Hall, 
Griliches, and Hausman, 1986; Lach and Schankerman, 1988), with two consequences, one 
substantive and one that affects empirical work in this area. First, the equilibrium required rate of 
return to R&D may be quite high simply to cover the adjustment costs. Second, and related to the 
first, is that it will be difficult to measure the impact of changes in the costs of capital, because such 
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effects can be weak in the short run due to the sluggish response of R&D to any changes in its cost. 
J. Brown and Petersen (2009) offer direct evidence that U. S. firms relied heavily on cash reserves to 
smooth R&D spending during the 1998-2002 boom and bust in stock market returns.  
A second important feature of R&D investment is the degree of uncertainty associated with 
its output. This uncertainty tends to be greatest at the beginning of a research program or project, 
which implies that an optimal R&D strategy has an options-like character and should not really be 
analyzed in a static framework. R&D projects with small probabilities of great success in the future 
may be worth continuing even if they do not pass an expected rate of return test. The uncertainty 
here can be extreme and not a simple matter of a well-specified distribution with a mean and 
variance. There is evidence, such as that in Scherer (1998), that the distribution of profits from 
innovation sometimes has a Paretian character where the variance does not exist. When this is the 
case, standard risk-adjustment methods will not work well.  
In spite of the problems suggested by the nature of uncertainty in this area, the starting point 
for the analysis of R&D investment financing has been the “neo-classical“ marginal profit condition, 
suitably modified to take the special features of R&D into account. Following the formulation in 
Hall and Van Reenen (2000), we define the user cost of R&D investment ρ as the pre-tax real rate of 
return on a marginal investment that is required to earn a return r after (corporate) tax. The firm 
invests to the point where the marginal product of R&D capital equals ρ: 
 ρ δ
τ
− −
= = + − ∆ +
−
1
( / )
1
d c
R R
A A
MPK r p p MAC  (1) 
τ is the corporate tax rate, δ is the (economic) depreciation rate, the term in pR is the relative 
appreciation or depreciation of R&D capital, and MAC is the marginal adjustment cost.  
In this equation, Ad and Ac are the present discounted value of deprecation allowances and 
tax credits respectively. In most financial accounting systems, including those used by major OECD 
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economies, R&D is expensed as it is incurred rather than capitalized and depreciated, which means 
that the lifetime of the investment for accounting purposes is much shorter than the economic life 
of the asset created and that Ad is simply equal to τ for tax-paying firms. Many countries have a form 
of tax credit for R&D, either incremental or otherwise, and this will be reflected in a positive value 
for Ac.2 Note that when Ac is zero, the corporate tax rate does not enter into the marginal R&D 
decision, because of the full deductability of R&D.  
The user cost formulation above directs attention to the following determinants of R&D 
financing:  
1. tax treatment such as tax credits, which are clearly amenable to intervention by policy 
makers. 
2. economic depreciation δ, which in the case of R&D is more properly termed obsolesence. 
This quantity is sensitive to the realized rate of technical change in the industry, which is in 
turn determined by such things as competition, market structure and the rate of imitation. 
Thus it is inappropriate to treat δ as an invariant parameter in this setting. 
3. the marginal costs of adjusting the level of the R&D program. 
4. the investor’s required rate of return r. 
The last item has been the subject of considerable theoretical and empirical interest, on the 
part of both industrial organization and corporate finance economists. Two broad strands of 
investigation can be observed: one focuses on the role of asymmetric information and moral hazard 
in raising the required rate of return abve that normally used for conventional investment, and the 
latter on the requirements of different sources of financing and their differing tax treatments for the 
rate of return. The next section of the paper discusses these factors.  
                                                 
2 See Hall and Van Reenen (2000) for details. For example, during the past three decades the US has had an incremental 
R&D tax credit with a value for Ac of about 0.13 at the time of writing. 
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3.  Theoretical background 
This section of the paper reviews the reasons that the impact of financial considerations on 
the investment decision may vary with the type of investment and with the source of funds in more 
detail. To do this, we distinguish between those factors that arise from various kinds of market 
failures in this setting and the purely financial (or tax-oriented) considerations that affect the cost of 
different sources of funds. 
One of the implications of the well-known Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958, 1961) is that a 
firm choosing the optimal levels of investment should be indifferent to its capital structure, and 
should face the same price for investment and R&D investment on the margin. The last dollar spent 
on each type of investment should yield the same expected rate of return (after adjustment for 
nondiversifiable risk). A large literature, both theoretical and empirical, has questioned the bases for 
this theorem, but it remains a useful starting point.  
Reasons why the theorem might fail in practice are several: 1) uncertainty coupled with 
incomplete markets may make a real options approach to the R&D investment decision more 
appropriate; 2) the cost of capital may differ by source of funds for non-tax reasons; 3) the cost of 
capital may differ by source of funds for tax reasons; and 4) the cost of capital may also differ across 
types of investments (tangible and intangible) for both tax and other reasons. 
With respect to R&D investment, economic theory advances a plethora of reasons why there 
might be a gap between the external and internal costs of capital; these can be divided into three 
main types: 
1. Asymmetric information between inventor/entrepreneur and investor. 
2. Moral hazard on the part of the inventor/entrepreneur arising from the separation of 
ownership and management. 
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3. Tax considerations that drive a wedge between external finance and finance by retained 
earnings. 
We discuss each of these reasons in separate sections below.  
3.1  Asymmetric information problems 
In the innovation setting, the asymmetric information problem refers to the fact that an 
inventor frequently has better information about the likelihood of success and the nature of the 
contemplated innovation project than potential investors. Therefore, the marketplace for financing 
the development of innovative ideas looks like the “lemons“ market modeled by Akerlof (1970). 
The lemons' premium for R&D will be higher than that for ordinary investment because investors 
have more difficulty distinguishing good projects from bad when the projects are long-term R&D 
investments than when they are more short-term or low-risk projects (Leland and Pyle, 1977). When 
the level of R&D expenditure is a highly observable signal, as it is under current U.S. and U.K. rules, 
we might expect that the lemons' problem is somewhat mitigated, but certainly not eliminated.3  
In the most extreme version of the lemons model, the market for R&D projects may 
disappear entirely if the asymmetric information problem is too great. Informal evidence suggests 
that some potential innovators believe this to be the case in fact. And as will be discussed below, 
venture capital systems are viewed by some as a solution to this “missing markets“ problem.  
Reducing information asymmetry via fuller disclosure is of limited effectiveness in this arena, 
due to the ease of imitation of inventive ideas. Firms are reluctant to reveal their innovative ideas to 
the marketplace and the fact that there could be a substantial cost to revealing information to their 
competitors reduces the quality of the signal they can make about a potential project (Bhattacharya 
                                                 
3 Since 1974, publicly traded firms in the United States have been required to report their total R&D expenditures in 
their annual reports and 10-K filings with the SEC, under FASB rule No. 2, issued October 1974. In 1989, a new 
accounting standard, SSAP 13, obligated similar disclosures in the UK. Most continental European countries have not 
had such a requirement in the past, but this is changing as hamonized international standards come into force. JAPAN 
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and Ritter, 1983; Anton and Yao, 1998). Thus the implication of asymmetric information coupled 
with the costliness of mitigating the problem is that firms and inventors will face a higher cost of 
external than internal capital for R&D due to the lemons’ premium. 
Some empirical support for this proposition exists, mostly in the form of event studies that 
measure the market response to announcements of new debt or share issues.4 Both Alam and 
Walton (1995) and Zantout (1997) find higher abnormal returns to firm shares following new debt 
issues when the firm is more R&D-intensive. The argument is that the acquisition of new sources of 
financing is good news when the firm has an asymmetric information problem because of its R&D 
strategy. Similary, Szewcxyk, Tsetsekos, and Zantout (1996) find that investment opportunities (as 
proxied by Tobin’s q) explain R&D-associated abnormal returns, and that these returns are higher 
when the firm is highly leveraged, implying a higher required rate of return for debt finance in 
equilibrium.  
3.2  Moral hazard problems 
Moral hazard in R&D investing arises in the usual way: modern industrial firms normally 
have separation of ownership and management. This leads to a principal-agent problem when the 
goals of the two conflict, which can result in investment strategies that are not share value 
maximizing. Two possible scenarios may co-exist: one is the usual tendency of managers to spend 
on activities that benefit them (growing the firm beyond efficient scale, nicer offices, etc.) and the 
second is a reluctance of risk averse managers to invest in uncertain R&D projects. Agency costs of 
the first type may be avoided by reducing the amount of free cash flow available to the managers by 
leveraging the firm, but this in turn forces them to use the higher cost external funds to finance 
                                                 
4 See Campbell, Lo, and McKinlay (1997) for a descripion of this methodology, which infers the value of a firm’s action 
when it is publicly announced by examining the market returns to a share of the firm’s stock in the period surrounding 
the announcement.  
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R&D (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Empirically, there seem to be limits to the use of the leveraging 
strategy in R&D-intensive sectors. See Hall (1990, 1994) for evidence that the LBO/restructuring 
wave of the 1980s was almost entirely confined to industries and firms where R&D was of no 
consequence. As we discuss in the next section, it is still true that R&D-intensive firms tend to have 
lower leverage than other firms on average.  
According to the second type of principal-agent conflict, managers are more risk averse than 
shareholders and avoid R&D projects that will increase the riskiness of the firm. If bankruptcy is a 
possibility, both managers whose opportunity cost is lower than their present earnings and potential 
bondholders may wish to avoid variance-increasing projects which shareholders would like to 
undertake. The argument of the theory is that long-term investments can suffer in this case. The 
optimal solution to this type of agency cost would be to increase the long-term incentives faced by 
the manager rather than reducing free cash flow. 
Evidence on the importance of agency costs as they relate to R&D takes several forms. 
Several researchers have studied the impact of antitakeover amendments (which arguably increase 
managerial security and willingness to take on risk while reducing managerial discipline) on R&D 
investment and firm value. Johnson and Rao (1997) find that such amendments are not followed by 
cuts in R&D, while Pugh, Jahara, and Oswald (1999) find that adoption of an Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP), which is a form of antitakeover protection, is followed by R&D increases. 
Cho (1992) finds that R&D intensity increases with the share that managerial shareholdings 
represent of the manager’s wealth and interprets this as incentive pay mitigating agency costs and 
inducing long term investment.  
Some have argued that institutional ownership of the managerial firm can reduce the agency 
costs due to free-riding by owners that is a feature of the governance of firms with diffuse 
ownership structure, while others have held that such ownership pays too much attention to short 
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term earnings and therefore discourages long term investments. Institutions such as mutual and 
pension funds often control somewhat larger blocks of shares than individuals, making monitoring 
firm and manager behavior a more effective and more rewarding activity for these organizations.  
There is some limited evidence that this may indeed be the case. Eng and Shackell (2001) 
find that firms adopting long term performance plans for their managers do not increase their R&D 
spending but that institutional ownership is associated with higher R&D; R&D firms tend not to be 
held by banks and insurance companies. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1997) find that high institutional 
investor ownership does not lead to short-term behavior on the part of the firm, in particular, it 
does not lead to cuts in R&D spending. Francis and Smith (1995) find that diffusely held firms are 
less innovative, implying that monitoring alleviates agency costs and enables investment in 
innovation.  
Although the evidence summarized above is fairly clear and indicates that long term 
incentives for managers can encourage R&D and that institutional ownership does not necessarily 
discourage R&D investment, it is fairly silent on the magnitude of these effects, and whether these 
governance features truly close the agency cost-induced gap between the cost of capital and the 
return to R&D.  
3.3  Capital structure and R&D 
In the view of some observers, the leveraged buyout (LBO) wave of the 1980s in the United 
States and the United Kingdom arose partly because high real interest rates meant that there were 
strong pressures to eliminate free cash flow within firms (Blair and Litan, 1990). For firms in 
industries where R&D is an important form of investment, such pressure should have been reduced 
by the need for internal funds to undertake such investment and indeed Hall (1993, 1994) and Opler 
and Titman (1993) find that firms with high R&D intensity were much less likely to experience an 
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LBO. Opler and Titman (1994) find that R&D firms that were leveraged suffered more than other 
firms when facing economic distress, presumably because leverage meant that they were unable to 
sustain R&D programs in the fact of reduced cash flow.  
A more recent look at the consequences of these transactions is by Lerner et al. (2008). The 
authors investigate 495 buyout transactions where there was a patent application in the nine years 
around the buyout. They find no evidence that LBOs are associated with a decrease in patenting. 
Relying on standard measures of patent quality, they find that patents granted to firms involved in 
private equity transactions are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no significant 
shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and are more concentrated in the most important 
and prominent areas of companies' innovative portfolios, suggesting a refocusing on the core 
business, but not a reduction in innovative activity.. 
In related work using data on Israeli firms, Blass and Yosha (2001) report that R&D-
intensive firms listed on the United States stock exchanges use highly equity-based sources of 
financing, whereas those listed only in Israel rely more on bank financing and government funding. 
The former are more profitable and faster-growing, which suggests that the choice of where to list 
the shares and whether to finance with new equity is indeed sensitive to the expected rate of return 
to the R&D being undertaken. That is, investors supplying arms-length finance require higher 
returns to compensate them for the risk of a “lemon.“ 
Although leverage may be a useful tool for reducing agency costs in the firm, it is of limited 
value for R&D-intensive firms. Because the knowledge asset created by R&D investment is 
intangible, partly embedded in human capital, and ordinarily very specialized to the particular firm in 
which it resides, the capital structure of R&D-intensive firms customarily exhibits considerably less 
leverage than that of other firms. Banks and other debtholders prefer to use physical assets to secure 
loans and are reluctant to lend when the project involves substantial R&D investment rather than 
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investment in plant and equipment. In the words of Williamson (1988), “redeployable“ assets (that 
is, assets whose value in an alternative use is almost as high as in their current use) are more suited to 
the governance structures associated with debt. Empirical support for this idea is provided by 
Alderson and Betker (1996), who find that liquidation costs and R&D are positively related across 
firms. The implication is that the sunk costs associated with R&D investment are higher than that 
for ordinary investment. 
In addition, servicing debt usually requires a stable source of cash flow, which makes it more 
difficult to find the funds for an R&D investment program that must be sustained at a certain level 
in order to be productive. For both these reasons, firms are either unable or reluctant to use debt 
finance for R&D investment, which may raise the cost of capital, depending on the precise tax 
treatment of debt versus equity.5 Confirming empirical evidence for the idea that limiting free cash 
flow in R&D firms is a less desirable method of reducing agency costs is provided by Chung and 
Wright (1998), who find that financial slack and R&D spending are correlated with the value of 
growth firms positively, but not correlated with that of other firms.  
3.4  Taxes and the source of funds 
Tax considerations that yield variations in the cost of capital across source of finance have 
been well articulated by Auerbach (1984) among others. He argued that under the U.S. tax system 
during most of its history the cost of financing new investment by debt has been less that of 
financing it by retained earnings, which is in turn less than that of issuing new shares. More 
explicitly, if r is the risk-adjusted required return to capital, τ is the corporate tax rate, θ is the 
personal tax rate, and c is the capital gains tax rate, we have the following required rates of return for 
different financing sources:  
                                                 
5 There is also considerable cross-sectional evidence for the United States that R&D intensity and leverage are negatively 
correlated across firms. See Friend and Lang (1988), Hall (1992), and Bhagat and Welch (1995).  
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Debt   r(1-τ)  interest deductible at the corporate level 
Retained earnings r(1-θ)/(1-c) avoids personal tax on dividends, but capital gains tax 
New shares  r/(1-c)  eventual capital gains tax 
If dividends are taxed, clearly financing with new shares is more expensive than financing with 
retained earnings. And unless the personal income tax rate is much higher than the sum of the 
corporate and capital gains rates, the following inequalities will both hold: 
 
1 1(1 )
1 1
θ
τ
−
− < <
− −c c
 (2) 
These inequalities express the facts that interest expense is deductible at the corporate level, 
while dividend payments are not, and that shareholders normally pay tax at a higher rate on retained 
earnings that are paid out than on those retained by the firm and invested.6 It implicitly assumes that 
the returns from the investment made will be retained by the firm and eventually taxed at the capital 
gains rate rather than the rate on ordinary income. 
It is also true that the tax treatment of R&D in most OECD economies is very different 
from that of other kinds of investment: because R&D is expensed as it is incurred, the effective tax 
rate on R&D assets is lower than that on either plant or equipment, with or without an R&D tax 
credit in place. This effectively means that the economic depreciation of R&D assets is considerably 
less than the depreciation allowed for tax purposes -- which is 100 percent -- so that the required 
rate of return for such investment would be lower. In addition some countries offer a tax credit or 
subsidy to R&D spending, which can reduce the after tax cost of capital even further.7  
                                                 
6 A detailed discussion of tax regimes in different countries is beyond the scope of this survey, but it is quite a common 
in several countries for long term capital gains on funds that remain with a firm for more than one year to be taxed at a 
lower rate than ordinary income. Of course, even if the tax rates on the two kinds of income are equal, the inequalities 
will hold. Only in the case where dividends are not taxed at the corporate level (which was formerly the case in the UK) 
will the ranking given above not hold.  
7 See Hall and Van Reenen (2000) for details.  
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The conclusion from this section of the paper is that the presence of either asymmetric 
information or a principal-agent conflict imply that new debt or equity finance will be relatively 
more expensive for R&D than for ordinary investment, and that considerations such as lack of 
collateral further reduce the possibility of debt finance. Together, these arguments suggest an 
important role for retained earnings in the R&D investment decision, independent of their value as a 
signal of future profitability. In fact, as has been argued by both Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and 
Petersen (1994), there is good reason to think that positive cash flow may be more important for 
R&D than for ordinary investment. The next section summarizes the results from empirical tests for 
this proposition.  
4.  Testing for financial constraints 
The usual way to examine the empirical relevance of the arguments that R&D investment in 
established firms can be disadvantaged when internal funds are not available and recourse to 
external capital markets required is to estimate R&D investment equations and test for the presence 
of “liquidity“ constraints, or excess sensitivity to cash flow shocks. This approach builds on the 
extensive literature developed for testing ordinary investment equations for liquidity constraints 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). It suffers from many of the same 
difficulties as the estimates in the investment literature, plus one additional problem that arises from 
the tendency of firms to smooth R&D spending over time.  
The ideal experiment for identifying the effects of liquidity constraints on investment is to 
give firms additional cash exogenously, and observe whether they pass it on to shareholders or use it 
for investment and/or R&D. If they choose the first alternative, either the cost of capital to the firm 
has not fallen, or it has fallen but they still have no good investment opportunities. If they choose 
the second, then the firm must have had some unexploited investment opportunities that were not 
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profitable using more costly external finance. A finding that investment is sensitive to cash flow 
shocks that are not signals of future demand increases would reject the hypothesis that the cost of 
external funds is the same as the cost of internal funds. However, lack of true experiments of this 
kind forces researchers to use econometric techniques such as instrumental variables to attempt to 
control for demand shocks when estimating the investment demand equation, with varying degrees 
of success.  
The methodology for the identification of R&D investment equations is based on a simple 
supply and demand heuristic, as shown in Figure 1. The curve sloping downward to the right 
represents the demand for R&D investment funds and the curves sloping upward the supply of 
funds. Internal funds are available at a constant cost of capital until they are exhausted, at which 
point it becomes necessary to issue debt or equity in order to finance more investment. When the 
demand curve cuts the supply curve in the horizontal portion, a shock that increases cash flow (and 
shifts supply outward) has no effect on the level of investment. However, if the demand curve cuts 
the supply curve where it is upward sloping, it is possible for a shock to cash flow to shift the supply 
curve out in such a way as to induce a substantial increase in R&D investment. Figure 2 illustrates 
such a case, where the firm shifts from point A to point B in response to a cash flow shock that 
does not shift the demand curve.  
Econometric work that tests the hypothesis that financing constraints matter for R&D 
investment has largely been done using standard investment equation methodology. Two main 
approaches can be identified: one uses a neoclassical accelerator model with ad hoc dynamics to 
allow for the presence of adjustment costs, and the other an Euler equation derived from the 
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forward-looking dynamic program of a profit-maximizing firm that faces adjustment costs for 
capital.8  
The accelerator model begins with the marginal product equal to cost condition for capital: 
 =MPK C  (3) 
Assuming that the production function for the ith firm at time t is Cobb-Douglas, solving out the 
variable factors, and taking logarithms of this relationship yields 
 = + −it it i itk s a c  (4) 
where k = log(R&D capital), s = log(output or sales), and c = log(cost of R&D). ai captures any 
permanent differences across firms, including differences in the production function.  
Lagged adjustment of R&D capital to changes in its cost or expected future demand is 
allowed for by specifying an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) for the relationship between 
capital and sales. For example, specifying an ADL(2,2) and approximating the growth of the capital 
stock ∆k by R/K-δ yields an estimating equation of the following form: 
 
( 1)
, , ( 1), ( 2) ( 2),  ,  ( 1)
 −
= ∆ ∆ − − − − 
− 
R Rf s s k s time dummies firm dummies
K K
 (5) 
The time dummies capture the conventional cost of capital, assumed to be the same for all firms. 
Note that any variations in R&D capital depreciation common to all firms will be in the time 
dummies, and any variations specific to a firm or sector but constant over time will be in the firm 
dummies. Firm-specific costs related to financing constraints are included by adding current and 
lagged values of the cash flow/capital ratio to this equation. Because of the presence of firm 
dummies, estimation is done using first differences of this equation, instrumented by lagged values 
of the right hand side variables to correct for the potential endogeneity of the contemporaneous 
                                                 
8 A detailed consideration of the econometric estimation of these models can be found in Mairesse, Hall, and Mulkay 
(1999). See also Hall (1981). 
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values. In principle, this will also control for the potential simultaneity between current investment 
and the disturbance. However, if the firm’s planning horizon for its R&D programs is long enough, 
as we might expect in the biotechnology area, for example, we might be concerned about the validity 
of lagged instruments.  
The Euler equation approach begins with the following first order condition for investment 
in two adjacent periods: 
 11 1 1(1 )( ) (1 ) ( ) 0
αδ
α
−
− − −
  
+ − + − + + =  
  
t
t t t t t t
t
E MPK p MAC r p MAC  (6) 
where MAC denotes the marginal adjustment costs for R&D capital and αt is the shadow value of 
investment funds in period t, which will be unity if there are no financing constraints. After 
specifying a Cobb-Douglas production function and quadratic adjustment costs, we obtain the 
following estimating equation: 
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− − − − − =  
−    
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 (7) 
where Z is a set of appropriate instrumental variables. As in the case of the accelerator model, this 
equation is usually estimated in differenced form to remove the firm dummies, with lagged values of 
the right hand side variables as instruments.  
When financial constraints are present, the coefficient of lagged R&D investment in the 
Euler equation differs from (1+r) by the term (αt-1/αt). The implication is that when the firm changes 
its financial position (that is, the shadow value of additional funds for investment changes) between 
one period and the next, it will invest as though it is facing a cost of capital greater than r (when the 
shadow value falls between periods) or less than r (when the shadow value rises between periods). 
Clearly this is a very difficult test to perform because (αt-1/αt) is not constant across firms or across 
time periods, so it cannot be treated as a parameter.  
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Three solutions are possible: the first is to model (αt-1/αt) as a function of proxies for changes in 
financial position, such as dividend behavior, new share issues, or new debt issues. The second is 
more ad hoc: recall that this term also multiplies the price pt of R&D capital to create a firm-specific 
cost of capital. Most researchers simply include the cash flow to capital ratio in the model to proxy 
for the firm-specific cost of capital and test whether it enters in the presence of time dummies that 
are the same for all firms. This method assumes that all firms face the same R&D price (cost of 
capital), except for the cash flow effect.  
The third possibility is to stratify firms in some way that is related to the level of cash 
constraints that they face (for example, dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms) estimate 
separate investment equations for each group, and test whether the coefficients are equal. This last 
was the method used by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) in the paper that originated this 
literature. Note that these authors did not rely on the full Euler equation derivation, but used a 
version of the neoclassical accelerator model (the first model given above). See also Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) for a critique of their approach, and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000) for a 
response to the critique. 
During the past several years, various versions of the methodologies described above have 
been applied to data on the R&D investment of U.S., U.K., French, German, Irish, and Japanese 
firms. The firms examined are typically the largest and most important manufactuing firms in their 
economy. For example, Hall (1992) found a large positive elasticity between R&D and cash flow, 
using an accelerator-type model and a very large sample of U.S. manufacturing firms. The estimation 
methodology here controlled for both firm effects and simultaneity. Similarly and using some of the 
same data, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) looked at a panel of 179 U.S. small firms in high-tech 
industries and find an economically large and statistically significant relationship between R&D 
investment and internal finance.  
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More recently, J. Brown et al. (2009) have shown that both cash flow and the issuance of 
public equity are very important for younger U.S. firms during the 1990-2004 period, while they 
have little impact on mature firm R&D investment. They focus on the high-technology sector 
(drugs, office and computing equipment, communications equipment, electronic components, 
scientific instruments, medical instruments, and software), which accounts for almost all of the 
increase in R&D during this period, and use Euler equation methods with fixed firm effects and 
industry-level year dummies to remove most of the variation due to unobserved differences in firm 
characteristics and demand shocks across industry. A novel finding in this paper and a companion 
paper by J. Brown and Petersen (2009) is the increased importance of public equity issuance in 
financing R&D in the United States, which doubtless reflects a shift in expectations on the part of 
investors during this period.  
Harhoff (1998) found weak but significant cash flow effects on R&D for both small and 
large German firms, although Euler equation estimates for R&D investment were uninformative due 
to the smoothness of R&D and the small sample size. Combining limited survey evidence with his 
regression results, he concludes that R&D investment in small German firms may be constrained by 
the availability of finance. Bond, Harhoff, and Van Reenen (1999) find significant differences 
between the cash flow impacts on R&D and investment for large manufacturing firms in the United 
Kingdom and Germany. German firms in their sample are insensitive to cash flow shocks, whereas 
the investment of non-R&D-doing UK firms does respond. Cash flow helps to predict whether a 
UK firm does R&D, but not the level of that R&D. They interpret their findings to mean that 
financial constraints are important for British firms, but that those which do R&D are a self-selected 
group that face fewer constraints. This is consistent with the view that the desire of firms to smooth 
R&D over time combines with the relatively high cost of financing it to reduce R&D well below the 
level that would obtain in a frictionless world.  
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Mulkay, Hall, and Mairesse (2001) perform a similar exercise using large French and U.S. 
manufacturing firms, finding that cash flow impacts are much larger in the U.S. than in France, both 
for R&D and for ordinary investment. Except for the well-known fact that R&D exhibits higher 
serial correlation than investment (presumably because of higher adjustment costs), differences in 
behavior are between countries, not between investment types, suggesting that they are due to 
differences in the structure of financial markets rather than the type of investment, tangible or 
intangible. This result is consistent with evidence reported in Hall, Mairesse, Branstetter, and Crepon 
(1999) for the U.S., France, and Japan during an earlier time period, which basically finds that R&D 
and investment on the one hand, and sales and cash flow on the other, are simultaneously 
determined in the United States (neither one “Granger-causes“ the other, whereas in the other 
countries, there is little feedback from sales and cash flows to the two investments. Using a 
nonstructural R&D investment equation together with data for the US, UK, Canada, Europe, and 
Japan, Bhagat and Welch (1995) found similar results for the 1985-1990 period, with stock returns 
predicting changes in R&D more strongly for the US and UK firms.  
Bougheas, Goerg, and Strobl (2001) examined the effects of liquidity constraints on R&D 
investment using firm-level data for manufacturing firms in Ireland and also found evidence that 
R&D investment in these firms is financially constrained, in line with the previous studies of US and 
UK firms. 
W. Brown (1997) argues that existing tests of the impact of capital market imperfections on 
innovative firms cannot distinguish between two possibilities: 1) capital markets are perfect and 
different factors drive the firm's different types of expenditure or 2) capital markets are imperfect 
and different types of expenditure react differently to a common factor (shocks to the supply of 
internal finance). He then compares the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for innovative and 
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non-innovative firms in the UK. The results support the hypothesis that capital markets are 
imperfect, finding that the investment of innovative firms is more sensitive to cash flow. 
The conclusions from this body of empirical work are several: first, there is solid evidence 
that debt is a disfavored source of finance for R&D investment; second, the “Anglo-Saxon“ 
economies, with their thick and highly developed stock markets and relatively transparent ownership 
structures, typically exhibit more sensitivity and responsiveness of R&D to cash flow than 
continental economies; third, and much more speculatively, this greater responsiveness may arise 
because they are financially constrained, in the sense that they view external sources of finance as 
much more costly than internal, and therefore require a considerably higher rate of return to 
investments done on the margin when they are tapping these sources. However, it is perhaps equally 
likely that this responsiveness occurs because firms are more sensitive to demand signals in thick 
financial equity markets; a definitive explanation of the “excess sensitivity“ result awaits further 
research.9 In addition to these results, the evidence from Germany and some other countries 
suggests that small firms are more likely to face this difficulty than large established firms (not 
surpisingly, if the source of the problem is a “lemons“ premium).  
From a policy perspective, these results point to another reason why it may be socially 
beneficial to offer tax incentives to companies, especially to small and new firms, in order to reduce 
the cost of capital they face for R&D investment. Many governments, including not only those in 
the developed world (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom), but also in the developing 
world (e. g., Chile, Brazil, and Argentina) currently have such programs. Such a policy approach 
simply observes that the cost of capital is relatively high for R&D and tries to close the gap via a tax 
                                                 
9 It is also true that much of the literature here has tended to downplay the role of measurement error in drawing 
conclusions from the results. Measurement error in Tobin’s q, cash flow, or output is likely to be sizable and will ensure 
that all variables will enter any specification of the R&D investment equation significantly, regardless of whether they 
truly belong or not. Instrumental variables estimation is a partial solution, but only if all the errors are serially 
uncorrelated, which is unlikely. 
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subsidy. However, there is an alternative approach relying on the private sector that attempts to 
close the financing gap by reducing the degree of asymmetric information and moral hazard rather 
than simply subsidizing the investment. We turn to this topic in the next section. 
5.  Small Firms, Startup Finance, and Venture Capital  
As should be apparent from much of the preceding discussion, any problems associated with 
financing investments in new technology will be most apparent for new entrants and startup firms. 
For this reason, many governments already provide some of form of assistance for such firms, and 
in many countries, especially the United States but also others such as Israel and Canada, there exists 
a private sector “venture capital“ industry that is focused on solving the problem of financing 
innovation for new and young firms. This section of the paper reviews what we know about these 
alternative funding mechanisms, beginning with then discussing the venture capital solution and 
then discussing public policy efforts. The discussion focuses on the United States for the most part, 
since the sector there is often the model for other countries, and most of the empirical evidence is 
based on US data.  
Venture capital can be defined as independently managed, dedicated capital focusing on 
equity or equity-linked investments in privately held, high-growth companies. Typically, these funds 
are raised from institutional and wealthy individual investors, through partnerships with a decade-
long duration. These funds are invested in young firms, typically in exchange for preferred stock 
with various special privileges. Ultimately, the venture capitalists sell these firms to corporate 
acquirers or else liquidate their holdings after taking the firms public. 
The first venture firm, American Research and Development, was formed in 1946 and 
invested in companies commercializing technology developed during the Second World War. 
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Because institutions were reluctant to invest, it was structured as a publicly traded closed-end fund 
and marketed mostly to individuals, a structure emulated by its successors. 
By 1978 limited partnerships had become the dominant investment structure. Limited 
partnerships have an important advantage in the United States: capital gains taxes are not paid by the 
limited partnership. Instead, only the taxable investors in the fund pay taxes. Venture partnerships 
have predetermined, finite lifetimes. To maintain limited liability, investors must not become 
involved in the management of the fund. 
Activity in the venture industry increased dramatically in early 1980s. Much of the growth 
stemmed from the US Department of Labor’s clarification of Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act’s ‘prudent man’ rule in 1979, which had prohibited pension funds from investing substantial 
amounts of money into venture capital or high-risk asset classes. The rule clarification explicitly 
allowed pension managers to invest in high-risk assets, including venture capital. 
The subsequent years saw both very good and trying times for venture capitalists. Venture 
capitalists backed many successful companies, including Apple Computer, Cisco, Genentech, 
Google, Netscape, Starbucks, and Yahoo! But commitments to the venture capital industry were 
very uneven, creating a great deal of instability. The annual flow of money into venture funds 
increased by a factor of ten during the early 1980s. From 1987 through 1991, however, fund-raising 
steadily declined as returns fell. Between 1996 and 2003, this pattern was repeated. Later in this 
chapter we discuss the reasons behind this cyclicality.  
Venture capital investing can be viewed as a cycle. In this section, we follow the cycle of 
venture capital activity. We begin with the formation of venture funds. We then consider the process 
by which such capital is invested in portfolio firms, and the exiting of such investments. We end 
with a discussion of open research questions, including those relating to internationalization and the 
real effects of venture activity. 
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5.1  Venture Investing  
The heart of the venture capital process is the connection between venture capitalists and 
the firms in which they invest. As discussed earlier, the economic and management literature 
emphasizes the informational asymmetries that characterize young firms, particularly in high-
technology industries. These problems make it difficult for investors to assess firms, and permit 
opportunistic behavior by entrepreneurs after finance is received. Specialized financial 
intermediaries, such as venture capitalists, address these problems by intensively scrutinizing firms 
before providing capital and monitoring them afterwards.  
Economic theory examines the role that venture capitalists play in mitigating agency 
conflicts between entrepreneurs and investors. The improvement in efficiency might be due to the 
active monitoring and advice that is provided (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; Hellmann, 1998; Marx, 
1994), the screening mechanisms employed (Chan, 1983), the incentives to exit (Berglöf, 1994), the 
proper syndication of the investment (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994), or investment staging 
(Bergmann-Hege, 1998; Sahlman, 1990).  
Staged capital infusion is the most potent control mechanism a venture capitalist can 
employ. The shorter the duration of an individual round of financing, the more frequently the 
venture capitalist monitors the entrepreneur’s progress. The duration of funding should decline and 
the frequency of re-evaluation increase when the venture capitalist believes that conflicts with the 
entrepreneur are likely. 
If monitoring and information gathering are important – as models such as those of Amit, 
Glosten and Muller (1990) and Chan (1983) suggest – venture capitalists should invest in firms 
where asymmetric problems are likely, such as early-stage and high-technology firms with intangible 
assets. The capital constraints faced by these companies will be large and these investors will address 
them. 
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Gompers (1995) shows that venture capitalists concentrate investments in early-stage 
companies and high-technology industries where informational asymmetries are significant and 
monitoring is valuable. He finds that early-stage firms receive significantly less money per round. 
Increases in asset tangibility are associated with longer financing duration and reduce monitoring 
intensity, presumably because such assets increase the salvage value of the firm if the enterprise fails.  
In a related paper, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) document how venture capitalists allocate 
control and ownership rights contingent on financial and non-financial performance. If a portfolio 
company performs poorly, venture capitalists obtain full control. As performance improves, the 
entrepreneur obtains more control. If the firm does well, the venture capitalists relinquish most of 
their control rights but retain their equity stake. 
Related evidence comes from Hsu (2004), who studies the price entrepreneurs pay to be 
associated with reputable venture capitalists. He analyses firms which received financing offers from 
multiple venture capitalists. Hsu shows that high investor experience is associated with a substantial 
discount in firm valuation.  
Venture capitalists usually make investments with peers. The lead venture firm involves 
other venture firms. One critical rationale for syndication in the venture industry is that peers 
provide a second opinion on the investment opportunity and limit the danger of funding bad deals.  
Lerner (1994a) finds that in the early investment rounds experienced venture capitalists tend 
to syndicate only with venture firms that have similar experience. He argues that, if a venture 
capitalist were looking for a second opinion, then he would want to get one from someone of 
similar or greater ability, certainly not from someone of lesser ability. 
The advice and support provided by venture capitalists is often embodied in their role on the 
firm’s board of directors. Lerner (1995) examines whether venture capitalists’ representation on the 
boards of the private firms in their portfolios is greater when the need for oversight is larger, looking 
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at changes in board membership around the replacement of CEOs. He finds that an average of 1.75 
venture capitalists are added to the board between financing rounds when a firm’s CEO is replaced 
in the interval; between other rounds 0.24 venture directors are added. No differences are found in 
the addition of other outside directors.  
Hochberg (2005) studies the influence of venture capitalists on the governance of a firm 
following its initial public offering (IPO). Venture-backed firms manage earnings less in the IPO 
year, as measured by discretionary accounting accruals. Venture-backed firms also experience a 
stronger wealth effect when they adopt a poison pill, which implies that investors are less worried 
that the poison pill will entrench management at the expense of shareholders. Finally, venture-
backed firms more frequently have independent boards and audit and compensation committees, as 
well as separate CEOs and chairmen. 
So far, this section has highlighted the ways in which venture capitalists can successfully 
address agency problems in portfolio firms. During periods when the amount of money flowing into 
the industry grows dramatically, however, competition between venture groups can introduce 
distortions. This is shown in Figure 3, which shows relationship between venture returns and the 
amount invested in these funds. The returns are measured by the Sand Hill Index, which is a value-
weighted and continuously-invested  index of the value of venture funded companies from their first 
round of institutional funding to their exit.10 The money invested series (also from Sand Hill 
Econometrics) is the total dollars invested in the companies in the Sand Hill Index each month. 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) examine the relation between the valuation of venture deals and 
inflows into venture funds. Doubling inflows leads to a 7–21 per cent increase in valuation levels. 
But success rates do not differ significantly between investments made during periods of low inflows 
and valuations on the one hand and those made in booms on the other. The results indicate that the 
                                                 
10 See the Sand Hill Econometrics website for details on the construction of this indes. http://www.sandhillecon.com 
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price increases reflect increasing competition for investment, rather than changes in the expected 
returns. 
5.2  Exiting 
A third major area of research has been the process whereby venture funds exit investments. 
This topic is important because, in order to make money on their investments, venture capitalists 
must sell their equity stakes.  
Initial research into the exiting of venture investments focused on Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs), reflecting the fact that the most profitable exit opportunity is usually an IPO. Barry et al. 
(1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) document that venture capitalists hold significant equity 
stakes and board positions in the firms they take public, which they continue to hold a year after the 
IPO. They argue that this pattern reflects the certification they provide to investors that the firms 
they bring to market are not overvalued. Moreover, they show that venture-backed IPOs have less 
of a positive return on their first trading day, a finding that has been subsequently challenged (Lee 
and Wahal, 2004; Kraus, 2002). The authors suggest that investors need a smaller discount because 
the venture capitalist has certified the offering’s quality. 
Subsequent research has examined the timing of the exit decision. Several potential factors 
affect when venture capitalists choose to bring firms public. Lerner (1994b) examines how the 
valuation of public securities affects whether and when venture capitalists choose to finance 
companies in another private round in preference to taking the firm public. He shows that investors 
tend to take the firm public when the market value is high, relying on private financings when 
valuations are lower. Seasoned venture capitalists appear more proficient at timing IPOs. This 
finding is consistent with the work by J. Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen on the importance of public 
equity financing of R&D during the 1990s stock market boom.  
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Another consideration may be the venture capitalist’s reputation. Gompers (1996) argues 
that young venture firms have incentives to ‘grandstand’, or take actions that signal their ability to 
potential investors. Specifically, young venture firms bring companies public earlier than older one 
to establish a reputation and successfully raise new funds. Gompers shows that the effect of recent 
IPOs on the amount of capital raised is stronger for young venture firms, providing them with 
greater incentives to bring companies public earlier.  
Lee and Wahal (2004) propose a variant of the ‘grandstanding’ hypothesis: they posit that 
venture firms have an incentive to underprice IPOs. The publicity surrounding a successful offering 
will enable the venture group to raise more capital than it could otherwise. Lee and Wahal confirm 
this hypothesis by showing a positive relationship between first-day returns and subsequent fund-
raising by venture firms. 
The typical venture firm, however, does not sell its equity at the time of the IPO. After some 
time, venture capitalists usually return money to their limited partners by transferring the shares to 
their investors, who are free either to hold or sell them. Gompers and Lerner (1998a) examine these 
distributions. After significant increases in stock prices prior to distribution, abnormal returns 
around the time of the distribution are negative. Cumulative excess returns for the 12 months 
following the distribution also appear to be negative. While the overall level of venture capital 
returns does not exhibit abnormal returns relative to the market (Brav and Gompers, 1997), there is 
a distinct rise and fall around the time of the stock distribution. The results are consistent with 
venture capitalists possessing inside information and with the (partial) adjustment of the market to 
that information.  
A related research area is venture-fund performance. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show 
substantial performance persistence across consecutive venture funds with the same general 
partners. General partners that outperform the industry in one fund are likely to outperform in the 
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next fund, while those who underperform in one fund are likely to underperform with the next 
fund. These results contrast with those of mutual funds, where persistence is difficult to identify.  
Cochrane (2005) estimates the returns of venture capital investments. He notes that many 
analyses of returns focus only on investments that go public, get acquired, or go out of business. 
Such calculations may produce biased returns by concentrating only on the portfolio’s ‘winners’ and 
outright failures, ignoring those firms that remain within the fund for longer periods. Cochrane 
develops a maximum likelihood estimate that uses existing data, but adjusts for these selection 
biases. While these papers – as well as Gompers and Lerner (1997) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 
(2003) – represent a first step towards understanding these issues, much more work remains to be 
done in this area. 
5.3  Venture Fund-raising 
Finally, research into the formation of venture funds has focused on two topics. First, the 
commitments to the venture capital industry have been highly variable since the mid-1970s. 
Understanding the determinants of this variability has been a topic of continuing interest to 
researchers. Second, the structure of venture partnerships has attracted increasing attention. 
First, Poterba (1987; 1989) notes that the fluctuations could arise from changes in either the 
supply of or the demand for venture capital. It is very likely, he argues, that decreases in capital gains 
tax rates increase commitments to venture funds, even though the bulk of the funds are from tax-
exempt investors. The drop in the tax rate may spur corporate employees to become entrepreneurs, 
thereby increasing the need for venture capital. The increase in demand due to greater 
entrepreneurial activity leads to more venture fund-raising. 
Gompers and Lerner (1998b) find empirical support for Poterba’s claim: lower capital gains 
taxes have particularly strong effects on venture capital supplied by tax-exempt investors. This 
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suggests that the primary mechanism by which capital gains tax cuts affect venture fund-raising is 
the higher demand of entrepreneurs for capital. The authors also find that a number of other factors 
influence venture fund-raising, such as regulatory changes and the returns of venture funds.  
A second line of research has examined the contracts that govern the relationship between 
investors (limited partners) and the venture capitalist (general partner). Gompers and Lerner (1999) 
find that compensation for older and larger venture capital organizations is more sensitive to 
performance than that of other venture groups. Also, the cross-sectional variation in compensation 
terms for younger, smaller venture organizations is considerably lower. The fixed component of 
compensation is higher for smaller, younger funds and funds focusing on high-technology or early-
stage investments. Finally, Gompers and Lerner do not find any relationship between the incentive 
compensation and performance. 
The authors argue that these results are consistent with a learning model in which neither the 
venture capitalist nor the investor knows the venture capitalist’s ability. With his early funds, the 
venture capitalist will work hard even without explicit pay-for-performance incentives: if he can 
establish a good reputation, he can raise subsequent funds. These reputation concerns lead to lower 
pay for performance for smaller and younger venture organizations. Once a reputation has been 
established, explicit incentive compensation is needed to induce the proper effort. 
Covenants also play an important role in limiting conflicts in venture partnerships. Their use 
may be explained by two hypotheses. First, because negotiating and monitoring covenants are costly, 
they will be employed when monitoring is easier and the potential for opportunistic behaviour is 
greater. Second, in the short run the supply of venture capital services may be fixed, with a modest 
number of funds of carefully limited size raised each year. Increases in demand may lead to higher 
prices when contracts are written. Higher prices may include not only increases in monetary 
compensation, but also greater consumption of private benefits through fewer covenants. 
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Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that both supply and demand conditions and costly 
contracting are important in determining contractual provisions. Fewer restrictions are found in 
funds established during years with greater capital inflows and funds, when general partners enjoy 
higher compensation. The evidence illustrates the importance of general market conditions on the 
restrictiveness of venture partnerships. In periods when venture capitalists have relatively more 
bargaining power—for instance, when there is a big increase in the funds being invested in venture 
funds—the venture capitalists are able to raise money with fewer strings attached.  
5.4  The globalization of venture capital 
While financial economists know much more about venture capital than they did a decade 
ago, there are many unresolved issues. We highlight here three promising areas, beginning with the 
globalization of the industry. 
The rapid growth in the U.S. venture capital market has led institutional investors to look 
increasingly at private equity alternatives abroad. To date, however, outside of the United Kingdom 
(where performance of funds has been quite poor), Israel, Canada and New Zealand, there has been 
little venture capital activity abroad. Figure 4 shows venture capital as a share of GDP in 2007 for a 
number of countries.11 Black and Gilson (1998) argue that the key source of the U.S. competitive 
advantage in venture capital is the existence of a robust IPO market. Venture capitalists can commit 
to transfer control back to the entrepreneur when a public equity market for new issues exists. This 
commitment device is unavailable in economies dominated by banks, such as Germany and Japan. 
The rapid growth in the US venture capital market has led institutional investors to look 
abroad. In a pioneering study, Jeng and Wells (2000) examine the factors that influence venture 
                                                 
11One potential source of confusion is that the term venture capital is used differently different in Europe and Asia. 
Abroad, venture capital often refers to all private equity, including buyout, late stage, and mezzanine financing (which 
represent the vast majority of the private equity pool in most overseas markets). In the U.S., these are separate classes. 
The data in Figures 3 and 4 are corrected for this fact and we confine our discussion of international trends to venture 
capital using the restrictive, U.S. definition. 
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fund-raising internationally. They find that the strength of the IPO market is an important 
determinant of venture commitments, supporting Black and Gilson’s hypothesis that the key to a 
successful venture industry is the existence of robust IPO markets. Jeng and Wells find, however, 
that the IPO market does not influence commitments to early-stage funds as much as those to later-
stage ones. Much more remains to be explored regarding the internationalization of venture capital. 
Certainly, with a few exceptions such as Australia, China, India, and Japan, venture capital remains 
focused on the United States, as Figure 5 illustrates. Relative to the size of their GDP share, the 
European Union countries have almost no seed and startup funding when compared to the rest of 
the developed world.  
A related question is why other financial intermediaries (such as banks) cannot duplicate 
these features of the venture capitalists, and undertake the same sort of monitoring. Economists 
have suggested several explanations for the apparent superiority of venture funds in this regard. 
First, because regulations limit banks’ ability to hold shares, at least in the U.S., they cannot freely 
use equity. Second, banks may not have the necessary skills to evaluate projects with few 
collateralizable assets and significant uncertainty. Finally, venture funds’ high-powered compensation 
schemes give venture capitalists incentives to monitor firms closely. Banks sponsoring venture funds 
without high-powered incentives have found it difficult to retain personnel.  
5.5  The real effects of venture capital 
A second area is even thornier: the impact of venture capital on the economy. While 
theorists have suggested a variety of mechanisms by which venture capital may affect innovation, the 
empirical record is more mixed. It might be thought that establishing a relationship between venture 
capital and innovation would be straightforward. For instance, one could look in regressions across 
industries and time whether, controlling for R&D spending, venture capital funding has an impact 
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on various measures of innovation. But even a simple model of the relationship between venture 
capital, R&D, and innovation suggests that this approach is likely to give misleading estimates.  
Both venture funding and innovation could be positively related to a third unobserved 
factor, the arrival of technological opportunities. Thus, there could be more innovation at times that 
there was more venture capital, not because the venture capital caused the innovation, but rather 
because the venture capitalists reacted to some fundamental technological shock which was sure to 
lead to more innovation. To date, only a handful of papers have attempted to address these 
challenging issues. 
The first of these papers, Hellmann and Puri (2000), examines a sample of 170 recently 
formed firms in Silicon Valley, including both venture-backed and non-venture firms. Using 
questionnaire responses, they find empirical evidence that venture capital financing is related to 
product market strategies and outcomes of startups. They find that firms that are pursuing what they 
term an innovator strategy (a classification based on the content analysis of survey responses) are 
significantly more likely to obtain venture capital and also obtain it more quickly. The presence of a 
venture capitalist is also associated with a significant reduction in the time taken to bring a product 
to market, especially for innovators. Furthermore, firms are more likely to list obtaining venture 
capital as a significant milestone in the lifecycle of the company as compared to other financing 
events.  
The results suggest significant interrelations between investor type and product market 
dimensions, and a role of venture capital in encouraging innovative companies. Given the small size 
of the sample and the limited data, they can only modestly address concerns about causality. 
Unfortunately, the possibility remains that more innovative firms select venture capital for financing, 
rather than venture capital causing firms to be more innovative. 
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Kortum and Lerner (2000), by way of contrast, examine whether these patterns can be 
discerned on an aggregate industry level, rather than on the firm level. They address concerns about 
causality in two ways. First, they exploit the major discontinuity in the recent history of the venture 
capital industry: as discussed above, in the late 1970s, the U.S. Department of Labor clarified the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, a policy shift that freed pensions to invest in venture 
capital. This shift led to a sharp increase in the funds committed to venture capital. This type of 
exogenous change should identify the role of venture capital, because it is unlikely to be related to 
the arrival of entrepreneurial opportunities. They exploit this shift in instrumental variable 
regressions. Second, they use R&D expenditures to control for the arrival of technological 
opportunities that are anticipated by economic actors at the time, but that are unobserved to 
econometricians. In the framework of a simple model, they show that the causality problem 
disappears if they estimate the impact of venture capital on the patent-R&D ratio, rather than on 
patenting itself. 
Even after addressing these causality concerns, the results suggest that venture funding does 
have a strong positive impact on innovation. The estimated coefficients vary according to the 
techniques employed, but on average a dollar of venture capital appears to be three to four times 
more potent in stimulating patenting than a dollar of traditional corporate R&D. The estimates 
therefore suggest that venture capital, even though it averaged less than three percent of corporate 
R&D from 1983 to 1992, is responsible for a much greater share—perhaps ten percent—of U.S. 
industrial innovations in this decade. These findings have been supported by recent working paper 
by Mollica and Zingales (2007), who also use an instrumental variable approach based on state 
pension fund resources to look at the relationship of venture capital and innovation and find a 
strong relationship. 
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Some of the most interesting theoretical work in recent years has focused not on the 
question of whether venture capitalists spur innovation, but rather on the societal consequences of 
the relationship between venture-backed entrepreneurship and innovation. Landier (2006) presents a 
model in which entrepreneurial venture succeed or fail on the basis of ability and luck.12 He argues 
that as the venture progresses, the entrepreneur is likely to learn about the likely eventual success of 
the venture, but that the decision to continue or abandon the venture will not be the same in all 
environments. In particular, the decision depends critically on how expensive it would be to raise 
capital for a new venture from investors after a failure. In this setting, Landier shows, multiple 
equilibria can arise. If the cost of capital for a new venture after a failure is not very high, 
entrepreneurs will be willing to readily abandon ventures, and failure is commonplace but not very 
costly. Alternatively, if the cost of capital for failed entrepreneurs is high, only extremely poor 
projects will be abandoned. Thus, societies may differ dramatically in the prevalence of 
experimentation in high-risk, innovative ventures. But certainly, given the fact that even the question 
of whether venture capitalists make private returns which compensate them for the risk that they 
take on is controversial (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005), it is premature to conclude what the social 
returns are.  
5.6  Government funding for startup firms  
One provocative finding from Jeng and Wells’s analysis is that government policy can 
dramatically affect the health of the venture sector. Researchers have only begun to examine the 
ways in which policymakers can catalyse the growth of venture capital and the companies in which 
they invest (Irwin and Klenow, 1996; Lerner, 1999; Wallsten, 2000; Avnimelech and Teubal, 2004; 
Gilson, 2008). Clearly, much more needs to be done in this arena.  
                                                 
12See also Gromb and Scharfstein (2002) for a thoughtful theoretical analysis that touches on many of these issues.  
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Examples of such programs are the U.S. Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) and 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programs. Together, these programs disbursed $2.4 
billion in 1995, more than 60% of the amount from venture capital in that year (Lerner 1998a). In 
Germany, more than 800 federal and state government financing programs have been established 
for new firms in the recent past (OECD 1995). In 1980, the Swedish established the first of a series 
of investment companies (along with instituting a series of measures such as reduced capital gains 
taxes to encourage private investments in startups), partly on the United States model. By 1987, the 
government share of venture capital funding was 43 percent (Karaomerliolu and Jacobsson 1999). 
Recently, the UK has instituted a series of government programs under the Enterprise Fund 
umbrella which allocate funds to small and medium-sized firms in high technology and certain 
regions, as well as guaranteeing some loans to small businesses (Bank of England 2001). There are 
also programs at the European level. 
A limited amount of evidence, most of it U.S.-based, exists as to the effectiveness and 
“additionality“ of these programs (see Lerner (2009) for a review of the key programs and their 
evaluaitons). In most cases, evaluating the success of the programs is difficult due to the lack of a 
“control“ group of similar firms that do not receive funding.13 Therefore most of the available 
studies are based on retrospective survey data provided by the recipients; few attempt to address the 
question of performance under the counterfactual seriously. A notable exception is the study by 
Lerner (1999), who looks at 1435 SBIR awardees and a matched sample of firms that did not receive 
awards, over a ten-year post-award period. Because most of the firms are privately held, he is unable 
to analyze the resulting valuation or profitability of the firms, but he does find that firms receiving 
SBIR grants grow significantly faster than the others after receipt of the grant. He attributes some of 
                                                 
13 See Jaffe (2002) for a review of methodologies for evaluation such government programs. For a complete review of 
the SBIR program, including some case studies, see the National Research Council (1998).  
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this effect to “quality certification“ by the government that enables the firm to raise funds from 
private sources as well.14  
A series of papers by Czarnitzki and co-authors (Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2003; Almus and 
Czarnitzki, 2004; Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2006) have looked at the performance of firms that 
receive public R&D subsidies in several European countries such as Belgium and Germany, using 
treatment effect analysis. They generally find that such subsidies do not completely displace private 
expenditure on R&D (that is, they are additional) and that they are productive in the sense that they 
result in patenting by the firm. Hall and Maffioli (2008) survey a similar set of results for large Latin 
American economies and reach a more nuanced conclusion.  
6.  Conclusions 
Based on the literature surveyed here, what do we know about the costs of financing R&D 
investments and the possibility that some kind of market failure exists in this area? Several main 
points emerge: 
 First, there is fairly clear evidence, based on theory, surveys, and empirical estimation, that 
small and startup firms in R&D-intensive industries face a higher cost of capital than their larger 
competitors and than firms in other industries. In addition to compelling theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence, the mere existence of the VC industry and the fact that it is concentrated 
precisely where these startups are most active suggests that this is so. The fact that ex post venture 
returns may lag the market, however, remains a puzzle and makes a clear-cut conclusion more 
complex.  
                                                 
14 Also see Spivack (2001) for further studies of such programs, including European studies, and David, Hall, and Toole 
(2000) and Klette, Moen, and Griliches Klette (2000) for surveys of the evaluation of government R&D programs in 
general.  
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Second, the evidence for a financing gap for large and established R&D firms is harder to 
establish. It is certainly the case that these firms prefer to use internally generated funds for 
financing investment, but less clear that there is an argument for intervention, beyond the favorable 
tax treatment that currently exists in many countries.15  
Third, the VC solution to the problem of financing innovation has its limits: First, it does 
tend to focus only on a few sectors at a time, and to make investment with a minimum size that is 
too large for startups in some fields. Second, good performance of the VC sector requires a thick 
market in small and new firm stocks (such as NASDAQ) in order to provide an exit strategy for 
early stage investors. Introducing a VC sector into an economy where it is not already present is 
nontrivial as it requires the presence of at least three interacting institutions: investors, experienced 
venture fund managers, and a market for IPOs.   
Fourth, the effectiveness of government incubators, seed funding, loan guarantees, and other 
such policies for funding R&D deserves further study, ideally in an experimental or quasi-
experimental setting. In particular, studying the cross-country variation in the performance of such 
programs would be desirable, because the outcomes may depend to a great extent on institutional 
factors that are difficult to control for using data from within a single country.  
Based on the survey of the literature presented here, other areas of interest for future 
research appear to be worthwhile. A longstanding debate in the literature is over the interaction 
between corporate governance and corporate finance and its impact on long term investment, 
including investment in intangibles such as R&D. Although in principle one might have thought that 
financial markets focused on quarterly performance, such as those in the Anglo-Saxon economies, 
                                                 
15 It is important to remind the reader of the premise of this paper: we are focusing only on the financing gap arguments 
for favorable treatment of R&D and ignoring (for the present) the arguments based on R&D spillovers and externalities. 
There is good reason to believe that the latter is a much more important consideration for large established firms, 
especially if we wish those firms to undertake basic research that is close to industry but with unknown applications (the 
Bell Labs model).  
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would discourage such investment, this appears not to be the case, at least in the United States. 
However, for several large European countries, we have limited evidence that the required rate of 
return to R&D investment is perhaps somewhat lower than in the U.S. and the U.K., especially 
when the firm has a large majority shareholder (see the Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen chapter, this 
volume). This fact suggests that for these firms at least, the stability provided by concentrated 
ownership may encourage R&D. At the same time, the more fluid financial markets with active 
markets for corporate control seem to be better at financing new entrants, startups, and more overall 
investment in innovation. The future challenge is to understand more completely the interaction of 
financial market discipline with various forms of corporate governance and how this influences the 
organization and performance of innovation.  
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